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Résumé du colloque
In this paper, a politico-economic model of government spending behavior is developed and used to analyse the evolution of Quebec government different types of expenditures over the period 1867-1969. In the tradition of Downs, Breton, and the Public Choice School, it is assumed that government maximizes its own utility. It has thus two objectives: higher popularity levels to ensure a larger probability of reelection and larger expenditures. The latter are divided into two types: vote-getting expenditures (such as road building) which affect and are affected by government popularity, and expenditures with no obvious electoral virtue such as outlays on education, health and welfare or law and order. It is argued that the latter (and even to some extent the former) types give government the satisfaction of more virtuous motives à la Breton: imprint on the society and the economy, and image in history. From the maximization of this utility function under a budgetary constraint equations are derived for popularity, 'popul'ar and other expenditures. The expenditure equations are further defined to obtain a separate one for each different category.
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